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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades or so, the Latin-American growth performance has been extre-
mely poor, especially when compared with Asian countries (see table 1). Something was 
apparently wrong in Latin America and it was obvious that another development strategy 
was needed. The days of CEP AL's import-substitution religion headed by Raul Prébisch 
as its high priest are definitely numbered. The Southern Cone countries introduced drastic 
policy changes already in the 1970s in order to open up their economies to competition 
from abroad and reap the benefits of the international division of labour. The record has 
been patchy, however. Latin America was hit by a number of adverse shocks, and even 
without such shocks a policy turnaround can only succeed if a number of conditions are 
fulfilled, in particular regarding macroeconomic policies. Nevertheless, it has been 
generally accepted in Latin America, especially in the smaller countries, that efficiënt 
production and growth calls for large markets and consequently (for those smaller 
countries) for much freer trade. 
^ Trade liberalization almost always implies a devaluation. First, conflicting aims of 
exchange-rate policy are studied. Next, we analyze what devaluations can do to help 
stimulate exports and what macroeconomic conditions must be fulfilled for devaluations to 
succeed. Finally, the experiences of three countries are reviewed, representing three 
different cases. In Chile trade liberalization has been drastic, in Colombia more cautious 
steps have been taken and in Uruguay early attempts that did not go very far anyway, 
unlike liberalization of the capital account, ended in failure. In all cases, we try to 
establish a relationship between the real exchange rate and the openness of the economy. 
We do not find any surprising results. It appears that the rate of exchange, in so far as 
it influences the real rate of exchange, can be used as an instrument to stimulate exports 
and open up the economy. The rate of exchange has also been used in Latin America as 
an instrument 
to fight infla-
vear all developing countries Western Hemisphere Asi a tion, but the 
average e x p e r i e n c e 
1974-83 1.3 0.5 3.2 has not been 
1984 2.0 1.4 6.5 a happy one. 
1985 2.1 1.3 5.2 11 s e e m s 
1986 1.1 1.0 4.8 preferable to 
1987 2.3 1.4 6.3 use monetary 
1988 1.5 - 1.6 7.1 and f iscal 
1989 1.4 - 1.2 3.6 policies to 
1990 1.8 - 2.1 3.8 that end. 
1991 1.3 0.8 4.1 
Table 1. Real per capita GDP growth, 1974-1992. 
Source: World Economie Outlook, IMF, October 1992, p.99. 
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2. AIMS OF EXCHANGE-RATE POLICEES 
2.1. Policy aims 
For governments, there's no getting round the need to follow some exchange-rate policy. 
First of all, they have to make a decision on wich system to adopt: a fixed-rate (for all 
practical purposes a fixed-but-adjustable peg) system, a fully-floating rate system, or 
something in between (such as a predetermined crawling peg or tablita system). Secondly, 
in a fixed-rate system some level of the exchange rate must be chosen and in a floating-
rate system a choice must be made between fully free floating and 'dirty' floating. The 
choices made depend on a government's policy aims on the one hand and the economie 
_ K environment on the other. Broadly speaking, one of two policy aims will take precedence: 
(i) the repression of inflation or (ii) export promotion. More generally, the rate of 
exchange can be utilized as a nominal anchor, such as is needed in a monetary economy 
to fix prices, or for attaining real targets (Corden, 1993). Other, less respectable aims 
may motivate governments in actual practice. In cases where there is no full conver-
tibility, i.e., where economie agents are not free to buy and sell any amount of foreign 
exchange they wish in official markets or at the official exchange rate, governments have 
an opportunity to confer favours on groups whose allegiance they seek for their survival, 
or the ruling groups may simply themselves appropriate the rents created by restricting 
access to the foreign-exchange market. Such behaviour may take various forms. There 
may be one official rate of exchange at which there is excess demand or there may be a 
multiple-rate system in force. Permits to buy foreign exchange, or permits to buy foreign 
exchange at a favorable rate, are valuable and can either be used to distribute favours or 
to siphon off rents. The government of the Sudan, e.g., is known to have allocated 
permits to buy cheap foreign exchange to certain powerful groups of traders whose sup-
port it was dependent on. Those traders thus were able to buy foreign goods cheaply and 
sell these at a high price on the domestic market (Brown, 1990, pp. 142, 215). We will 
concentrate here on the two policy aims first mentioned, but one should be aware that the 
world is a wicked place. Inconvertibility creates rents and these rents elicit morally 
reprehensible behaviour which, even worse in the eyes of some, is at odds with al-
locational efficiency and forms one reason for preferring full convertibility (the al-
locational inefficiënties will be discussed below in section 4). 
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2.2. The aim of repressing inflation 
It was the professed aim of the Southern Cone governments in the second half of the 
1970s to fight inflation with the help of the exchange rate. A very serious attempt was 
made by the Argentine Minister of Finance José Martinez de Hoz in the years 1976-80, 
first by means of fixed-but-adjustable parities and as from December 1978 with the help 
of a tablita system. Mr Martinez's attempt failed through a number of causes. First, 
though he succeeded in reducing the primary budget deficit, i.e., the deficit less interest 
payments on outstanding debt, from 6.9 per cent of GDP in 1976 and 6.0 per cent in 
1977 to 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1978 and 2.4 per cent in 1979, the total deficit remained 
intractable, reaching 12.9 per cent in 1976, 11.9 per cent in 1977, 10.1 per cent in 1978, 
9.0 per cent in 1979 and 11.3 per cent in 1980, after which it shot up again. Mr Martinez 
will also have cursed his luck when in 1980 a financial crisis broke out in which the 
central bank had to bail out the biggest three commercial banks. This implied pumping 
extra money in the economy. Finally, General Viola, who was to take over as head of 
state in March 1981, left everybody, including probably himself, in the dark about the 
economie policies he would adopt (cf Calvo, 1986, and Corbo and de Melo, 1987). The 
Argentine currency became grossly overvalued and economie agents expected Martinez's 
policy to founder. They invested in dollar-denominated accounts abroad and spent much 
on vacations in Brazil, as long as foreign exchange could still be bought cheaply. Only 
time can teil if the recent attempt by Minister Domingo, who fixed the dollar price of the 
Austral in April 1991 (and introduced a new peso in January 1992, without effectively 
changing the rate of exchange) will meet with more success. So far, he holds out, but 
prices are rising disconcertingly." The Chilean experience will be discussed below. 
Attempts to utilize the rate of exchange to fight inflation rest on the assumption that the 
Law of One Price is approximately relevant. For small countries, this fits in with the 
dependent-economy model. In this model, the Law of One Price applies to tradeables, for 
which the country in question is a price taker. Foreign-currency prices of tradeables are 
given and the way to keep domestic price rises of tradeables in check is to link the 
domestic currency firmly to a foreign currency. The logic is impeccable, provided the 
dependent-economy is relevant, but for such a policy to succeed, domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies must be not too expansionary. The rate of exchange in itself is clearly 
insufficiënt to contain inflationary pressure (cf Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993). In section 
3 the relevant model will be presented. 
2.3. The aim of export promotion 
If the aim of exchange-rate policy is to increase exports and improve the current account 
of the balance of payments, a high real exchange rate is called for. We define the 
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exchange rate e as the price of one unit of foreign currency expressed in units of 
domestic currency. The real exchange rate RER is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for 
the ratio of foreign and domestic price levels: RER = e.Pf/Pd (RER is a dimensionless 
variable in this definition; under purchasing power parity it equals unity). In the literature 
often the reciprocal of RER as defined here is used, but with our definition of e the 
present definition of RER appears logical: a rise in e means that foreign currency 
becomes more expensive relative to domestic currency, and a rise in RER means that 
foreign goods become more expensive relative to domestic goods. In the framework of 
the dependent-economy model another definition of RER is also used. RER as defined 
above implies an improvement of the competitiveness of domestic goods in world markets 
as RER rises, but in dependent-economy models the Law of One Price holds and similar 
goods have similar prices on all markets, so that price competition finds no place in the 
model. Instead, in dependent-economy models RER is defined as the ratio between 
tradeables prices PT and nontradeables prices PN (or its obverse). A rise in RER means 
that producing export goods or import-competing goods becomes more attractive to 
domestic producers. We will mostly use RER in the first sense. 
If export promotion is the driving force of exchange-rate policy, the dependent-
economy model is not the only one that presents itself. In that case, one need not believe 
that the Law of One Price is good approximation to reality. The tried and trusty IS/LM 
model, where prices and wages are sticky, could serve as well. For the sake of brevity, 
though, we remain within the confines of the dependent-economy model. 
2.4. The economie environment and the choice of exchange rates 
We mentioned the economie environment as one factor determining the choice of 
exchange-rate system. This concerns the choice between some form of fixed-rate system 
and a more flexible-rate system. Pegging one's currency to another currency may be an 
attractive option if there is a dominant trading partner, especially if the currency of that 
country is not subject to a serious fall in purchasing power, i.e., if inflation is low there. 
If international trade is more evenly spread over a number of countries whose exchange 
rates are not fixed, stabilization of the domestic currency in terms of a basket of other 
currencies may be the preferred option. If, however, export revenues fluctuate strongly 
because the main export good is a primary product with a widely fluctuating world 
market price, a floating rate may be called for in order to provide some protection to the 
domestic market against foreign shocks. Export receipts will fluctuate less wildly in terms 
of domestic currency if buoyant exports imply a low exchange rate and a depressed 
market leads to a high exchange rate. This helps provide a modicum of stabilization to 
nominal national income and also helps in adjusting imports, which is especially important 
if foreign exchange reserves or credit lines are insufficiënt to bridge a significant, even if 
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temporary, fall in export revenues. Generally, however, even if a stable nominal 
exchange rate is not feasible, a stable RER is certainly called for. With a fluctuating 
RER, exporters have less incentive to set up sales networks abroad and exports, most of 
all those of manufactures, suffer. 
3. THE DEPENDENT-ECONOMY MODEL 
3.1. Introduction 
We give a succinct graphical exposition of the dependent-economy model. It can of 
course be depicted with the help of the Salter diagram. Another kind of diagram, though, 
offers the opportunity to depict not only the equilibrium conditions in both good markets, 
but also explicitly the equilibrium condition in the Walrasian money market. A graphical 
analysis will suffice for an understanding of the working of the system (see for the 
algebra Frenkel and Mussa, 1985). 
3.2. The fixed-rate case 
We start with the fixed-rate case. The model is depicted in figure 1. NN shows the 
equilibrium condition in the market for nontradeables. As the money supply increases 
people feel richer and spend more. Starting from equilibrium, excess demand will develop 
in the nontradeables market. In order to maintain equilibrium, the relative price q of 
nontradeables has to rise. A rise in q causes a shift in production from tradeables to 
nontradeables and a shift in consumption from nontradeables to tradeables, thus elimina-
ting excess demand. Hence, NN has a positive slope. Similarly, an increase in the money 
supply will, starting from equilibrium, cause excess demand in the market for tradeables. 
The relative price of tradeables has to rise, i.e., q has to fall, in order to restore e-
quilibrium. TT is negatively sloped. A fall in q will set in train a shift in consumption 
away from tradeables and a shift in production toward tradebles. If the price mechanism 
functions smoothly, the economy is always on the NN curve, i.e., the market for 
nontradeables is always in equilibrium. There may, however, be disequilibria in the 
market for tradeables. A disequilibrium in the market for tradeables is just another term 
for a current account disequilibrium (neglecting international factor payments). Current 
account equilibrium is found at the intersection of the TT curve and the NN curve. It is to 
be noted that the situation of the NN and TT curves depends on both private and public 
spending propensities. 
Now consider an inflationary financed increase in government spending on nontrade-
ables. The NN curve will shift upward, for at any level of the money supply a higher 
relative price of nontradeables will be necessary to ensure equilibrium in the nontrade-
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ables market. Spending by the government 
has increased and, as can be seen from the 
figure, the money supply has to f all in 
order to prevent overspending. Private 
expenditure is reduced in this way. Conse-
quently, current-account equilibrium is 
also found at a lower level of the money 
supply, i.e., the CA curve shifts to the 
left. However, inflationary finance means 
that the money supply has risen rather 
than fallen. Over and above the upward 
shift of the NN curve, there has been a
 F i g u r e L Equilibrium situation in the de-
movement to the right along the NN
 p e n d e n t economy under fixed exchange 
curve, q has risen too much and must fall
 mieS-
again for equilibrium to be restored.
 S y m b o i s : q = pn/pt; M s = money supply, 
Abstracting from (net) international capital QJ^ _
 c u r r e n t account. 
flows, an automatic stabilizer is at work. 
The current account turns into deficit and, in the absence of net capital flows, the money 
supply decreases. If all goes well the economy starts sliding down the NN curve toward 
the intersection with the TT curve. Two conditions must be met, though, for such an 
automatic restoration of equilibrium to occur. First of all, money creation must stop. 
Secondly, we assumed price flexibility. Given tradeables price Pt, q can only fall if Pn 
falls. If the prices of nontradeables exhibit downward stickiness, unemployment will 
develop in the nontradeables market. In that case, the nominal rate of exchange can be 
utilized as an instrument to increase the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate has 
fallen, but has to rise in order to restore equilibrium. This can be brought about by a 
devaluation. Such a devaluation will immediately reduce the real money supply, i.e., in 
the model, the money supply in terms of tradeables and so reduce spending. If net capital 
inflows occur, the adjustment may be postponed, but subsequently an even higher fall in q 
may be necessary in order to create a surplus on the goods and services account, enabling 
interest and amortization to be paid. The economy now has to move to the left of the 
intersection of NN and TT. 
3.3. The floating rate case 
For the floating-rate case, the diagram differs slightly. The money supply is independent 
of the balance of payments. We drop the CA segment in the diagram and add a segment 
picturing the equilibrium condition in the Walrasian money money market, in the process 
restricting the transmission mechanisms between the monetary and the real sectors of the 
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economy to the interest rate mechanism (see figure 2). In the absence of net capital flows, 
the economy must be in the intersection of the NN and TT curves, if the price mechanism 
functions properly. With net capital flows, the economy must still be on the NN curve, 
but it need not be on the TT curve, as net capital flows compensate any disequilibrium on 
the current account. Consider the case of fully interestelastic capital flows (figure 3). In 
the case of capital imports the current account will be in deficit and the rèlative price of 
tradeables will be lower than in current account equilibrium. In other words, there is an 
excess demand for tradeables which translates into an import surplus. 
In the short term capital is sector specific. An increase in spending on nontradeables 
will draw labour away from tradeables production. The marginal product of labour falls 
in the nontradeables industry, but the rèlative price of nontradeables rises, as it will have 
to in order for the nontradebles industries to be able to match wages in the tradeables 
industries, which have risen in terms of tradeables (because of increased marginal 
product). Obviously, if real wages are sticky downward in terms of nontradeables, 
unemployment results. If now for some reason capital inflows dry up, as they generally 
did in Latin America in 19821, the rèlative price of tradeables will have to rise and real 
balances will have to fall in order to maintain Ml employment in both the tradeables and 
the nontradeables sectors. Production has to shift to tradeables because import surpluses 
are no longer financed by capital imports and real balances have to fall because nontrade-
ables have to become relatively cheaper and excess demand for nontradeables must be 
prevented. It will even be necessary to create an excess supply of tradeables in order to 
fulfil debt service obligations, which implies an even further fall of the rèlative price of 
nontradebles. Unemployment will now result if real wages exhibit downward stickiness in 
terms of tradeables. Obviously, the rèlative price of nontradeables cannot easily be 
reduced through an absolute price fall, so the common solution to the problem will be to 
let the exchange rate rise. Tradeables 
become more expensive and the average 
price level increases, which serves to 
diminish real balances, as is required for 
maintaining equilibrium in the nontradea-
bles market. It is to be noted that in the 
long term rèlative prices need a smaller 
change in order to bring about the desired 
change in production proportions. This is 
because factor mobility is a function of 
time (cf Hoffmann and Homburg, 1990). 
If labour is sector-specific, there is no 
way at all to avoid unemployment. 
Again, the success of the adjustment 
with free-floating exchange rates. " P r o c e s s h i n ê e s o n monetary and fiscal 
denendent-
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polies being restrictive. Too expansive 
monetary policies would lead to ongoing 
price increases and ongoing depreciations 
of the domestic currency. For fiscal poli-
cies, we have to make a distinction be-
tween government spending on tradeables 
and government spending on nontradea-
bles. In both cases, an increase means an 
upward shift of the relevant curve. An 
increase in spending on tradeables makes 
the TT curve shift upward, which leads to 
a higher rate of interest and, given the 
Figure 3. Capital imports in a dependent
 m o n e y s u p p l y > a M g h e r p r i c e l e v d T h e 
economy with floating exchange rate.
 r e l a ü v e p r i c e o f t r a d e a b l e s increases, 
which in this case can only mean that the 
absolute price of tradeables rises. This amounts to a depreciation of the currency. An 
increase in government spending on nontradeables has less clearcut results. The NN curve 
shifts upwards, the rèlative price of nontradeables rises and the general price level again 
goes up. Now these two movements are compatible with higher, lower and constant 
tradeable prices, so the exchange rate may stay put or move in any direction. With fully 
interestelastic capital flows an increase in government spending leaves the rate of interest, 
and, given the money demand function, the general price level, undisturbed. Higher 
spending translates into an excess demand for tradeables and a deficit on the current 
account which is financed by capital imports. 
A spending shock in the nontradeables market again does not influence the rate of 
interest or the general price level. Production has to shift from tradeables to nontra-
deables, which is dependent on a rise in the rèlative price of nontradeables. The rèlative 
price of nontradeables can only increase, given the average price level, if absolute 
nontradeable prices increase and absolute tradeable prices f all. This means an appreciation 
of the currency. The rèlative price of nontradeables moves beyond the point where the 
market for tradeables is in equilibrium. Tradeable prices are too low for equilibrium and, 
again, excess demand develops. Note that government spending shocks are here assumed 
to be neutrally financed, for the money supply remains unchanged. An increase in private 
spending propensities will have similar results. If now capital inflows dry up, not only 
restrictive monetary policies, but also restrictive fiscal policies will help maintain f uil 
employment during the drastic adjustment to a situation with an excess supply of 
tradeables rather than excess demand. A cutback in spending on tradeables will help 
sustain the rate of exchange, a cutback in spending on nontradeables will be accompanied 
by a depreciation. 
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3.4. A three-good economy 
The dependent economy model can be extended by splitting up tradeables into importables 
and exportables. Importables are both produced domestically and are imported and 
exportables are produced domestically and sold both in domestic and foreign markets. We 
remain within the framework of the dependent economy model (cf Aghevli, Khan and 
Montiel, 1991; see for a three-goods, two-factor model using an Edgeworth-Bowley box 
diagram Edwards, 1986(a)). World market prices of importables and exportables therefore 
are given for a small country. They need not, however, remain unchanged. The com-
modity terms of trade therefore may change. The model can be utilized to analyze a 
number of problems. Consider a reduction in import duties. Importable prices f all, excess 
demand develops in the importables market and excess supply in the exportables and 
nontradeables markets. The excess supply in the exportables sector helps finance the 
increased imports. To restore equilibrium in the nontradeables market a relative price 
reduction for tradeables is called for. As absolute price decreases are painful, this means 
a depreciation of the currency. 
Sector-specificity of production factors may, again, complicate the adjustment process 
(cf Novak, 1989, pp. 49-52). A reduction in protection will make importables cheaper 
relative to exportables and nontradeables. Labour will switch to exportables and nontrade-
ables. The marginal product of labour in terms of exportables and nontradeables will fall 
and if wages are sticky downward in terms of these goods unemployment will result. In 
the course of time, as capital also moves across sectors, the labour intensity of production 
in the exportables and nontradeables industries is reduced again. The marginal product of 
labour in terms of exportables" and nontradeables increases and wages will rise or 
unemployment will decrease. 
4. RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS 
If the rate of exchange is used as an instrument to stimulate exports, it is imperative to 
free the foreign-exchange market from restrictions that artificially keep the rate of 
exchange down. We first consider a unified official exchange rate and next a multiple-rate 
system. 
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4.1. Payments restrictions under a unified exchange rate 
All too often, a currency is overvalued in the sense that without restrictions even on 
current account payments its value cannot be maintained. Let the authorities fix the rate at 
OB, then excess demand is CG and foreign exchange has to be rationed one way or 
another. Beneficiaries earn a rent of ABCE and it is a society with unusually high ethical 
standards indeed in which no waste of resources in rent seeking, nepotism or outright 
bribery will occur. But even in a society of saints the burden of rationing on the economy 
is bound to be high. Usually, people have to wait for considerable periods bef ore foreign 
exchange is allotted to them. If the foreign exchange is needed for the import of spare 
parts or a replacement for worn-out machinery or simply for raw materials, production 
can be seriously affected. Also, the costs of running the system in terms of personnel can 
be considerable. Finally, people will do their utmost to circumvent regulations and resort 
to overinvoicing (in the case of importers) and underinvoicing (in the case of exporters; 
see for empirical estimates Gupta, 1984, and Dornbusch and Tellez Kuenzler, 1993, p. 
115, citing figures by J. Cuddington). Foreign exchange is siphoned off to a black market 
and the amount available to the authorities shrinks. 
When the foreign-exchange market is liberalized, overshooting of the exchange rate 
may occur. First, the exchange rate may rise to OA. As imports and exports react (see 
for the lags between devaluations and export increases Donovan, 1981; Krueger, 1978 p. 
176; Denoon, 1986, p. 5), the system will move in the direction of F. If a black market 
had been flourishing, the black market rate would have been not too much above F and 
the exchange rate paid by those who had no access to the official market will conse-
quently react less violently. 
If a liberalization of the foreign-exchange market induces high capital inflows, e.g., 
because of big foreign loans or a return of flight capital, continued restrictions on capital 
payments may temporarily be needed in order to prevent an appreciation that would price 
the country's products out of the market. We will return to this issue in section 5. 
Finally, it should be noted that this analysis suggests that not all devaluations are aimed 
at improving the current account of the 
balance of payments. Some at least are put 
into effect as part of a liberalization effort 
(Corden, 1993, p. 203). Nevertheless, the 
aim of increasing exports still stands, as 
liberalization means an increased partici-
pation in the international division of 
labour. Empirical research has shown that 
devaluations that form part of a liberaliza-
tion package give a large impetus to ex-
 F i g u r e 4 . T h e foreign-exchange market with 
ports, much larger than devaluations that
 m o v e r v a l u e d currency. 
e x c h a n p 
rate 
A 
B C 
* • " • 
^s^D 
D fo re ign 
exchange 
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do not (Donovan, 1981, p. 714). This suggests that inputs for export production indeed 
seriously suffer from import restrictions. Support is provided by Michaely et al, who 
found that exports grow rapidly after a relaxation of import restrictions and a rise in the 
RER (Michaely et al, 1991, p. 194, quoted by Falvey and Kim, 1992, p. 916). They 
even found that exports responded without any appreciable lag. 
4.2. Dual and multiple exchange rates 
International capital flows may cause substantial erratic shocks in the real exchange rate. 
The authorities may decide to control capital flows but could also decide not to intervene 
but to leave the capital account of the balance of payments to its own devices and fix a 
rate for current account transactions. This is an excellent principle, with often much lost 
in the execution, though. The monetary authorities would have to screen each and every 
individual foreign-exchange transaction, so administrative costs would be very high. Also, 
there would be strong incentives to cheat. Moreover, it may be difficult to defme the 
boundary between current account and capital account transactions: e.g., depending on the 
various rates, shifts between short-term loans and trade credit will occur. These problems 
are compounded if instead of a dual exchange rate a system of multiple rates applies. 
Just like payment restrictions in a unified exchange rate system, multiple rates lend 
themselves easily to abuse for political purposes. The allegiance of powerful groups can 
be bought by giving them access to cheap foreign exchange. More respectable ends can 
also be pursued by such a system. A government may, for instance, try to further 
economie development by applying a low exchange rate for traditional exports and 
essential imports and a high rate of exchange for non-traditional exports and non-essential 
imports, in order to stimulate non-traditional exports and curb non-essential imports. The 
rate of exchange in this way is deployed as an instrument of trade policy and industrial 
policy. Obviously, assuming for the moment that such policies are justified, for trade 
policy import duties and export rebates are the better instruments whilst for industrial 
policy taxes and subsidies would do the job with fewer distortions (cf Fleming, 1974). It 
is, for instance, hardly commendable to try and hinder imports of luxury goods and thus 
protect inefficiënt domestic production of such goods. Much better to levy an excise 
which burdens both domestic and foreign produce. Also, the way is wide open, again, to 
abuse. In Argentina, exports of wheat and meat were hindered for a number of years by a 
low rate of exchange (a high value of the peso) in order to keep domestic prices, and with 
them the urban cost of living, low. This was in the interests of urban capitalists but to the 
detriment of agrarian exporters (Cooper, 1973, p. 169). It must have been simply a case 
of a power struggle and had little to do with comparative advantage. After Martinez de 
Hoz abolished the discrimination in favour of exports from the urban industrial sector 
exports of wheat and meat soared, as indeed did total exports. It is to be noted that 
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multiple exchange rates may unduly burden the govemment deficit, se. if on average a 
high rate is paid to exporters and a low rate is asked from importers. It has been 
estimated that the central bank of Peru ran up a loss of 2 per cent of GDP in 1987 in this 
way (Dornbusch and Tellez Kuenzler, 1993, p. 107). 
In conclusion, payment restrictions and dual and multiple exchange rates pose a serious 
threat to welfare. They involve static welfare losses in terms of consumer rent and 
obstruct the smooth flow of production. Furthermore, they are costly to run and offer 
only too much opportunity for dubious activities. Also, it appears that trade and payments 
restrictions often include restrictions on the purchase of foreign know-how (Corbo and de 
Melo, 1985, Preface). Still, a case can be made for restrictions on capital transactions in 
order to insulate the real exchange rate from damaging shocks or for a dual exchange 
rate, for the same purpose, provided the system can be run efficiently by the authorities. 
Real exchange rate stability obviously may only come at a price. 
5. HOW TO GO ABOUT LIBERALIZATION 
If it is decided that international payments are to be liberalized as part of an overall 
liberalization process, the question arises which sequence would be best. Several com-
binations present themselves: 
(i) First liberalization of the current account, later foliowed by liberalization of the capital 
account; 
(ii) First liberalization of the capital account, later foliowed by liberalization of the 
current account; 
(iii) Simultaneous liberalization of the current account and the capital account. 
If a liberalization policy, coupled with a stabilization policy (suppression of inflation 
and cutting the government budget deficit) is seen as credible by the public, there is a 
high probability of substantial net capital imports. It will become relatively easy for 
domestic agents to borrow abroad and in addition flight capital will return. Such net 
capital imports may play havoc with attempts to stimulate exports (cf McKinnon, 1973, 
Ch. 11). In a fixed-rate system capital imports, if sizeable, lead to money creation which 
will make it very difficult to fight inflation. Nontradeable prices will rise relatively to 
tradeable prices and the production of tradeables becomes less profitable. In a floating-
rate system, the currency will appreciate, with similar results. Net capital imports may of 
course subside after some time, but if the production structure has been distorted by the 
capital imports, a restructuring will be painful; better to forestall such shocks. Anyhow, 
for a number of products marketing and setting up distribution networks abroad is costly 
and time-consuming and it would be better not to frustrate efforts in that direction at the 
outset. All this suggests that liberalization efforts aimed at greater participation of a 
country in international trade could be seriously undermined by simultaneously freeing the 
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capital account with the current account or even freeing the capital account before the 
current account. It would probably be wise, though, to ease restrictions on capital imports 
a bit at the time the current account is liberalized. Exports need time to build up, while 
liberalized imports may surge at once. In a fixed-rate system, the current account will 
tend to show a deficit at first, which could put quite a strain on the central bank's 
currency reserves if capital imports are now allowed to finance the current-account 
deficit. In a flexible-rate system the domestic currency would tend to depreciate strongly, 
only to appreciate later when export growth gets under steam. Relative prices, in 
particular those between tradeables and nontradeables, would move first in one direction, 
then in another, which of course is not very conducive to investment in hardware and in 
sales networks by exporters. 
Of course, one cannot be sure that liberalization of the capital account induces net 
capital inflows. The experiences of the 1970s, when af ter the 1973 oil crisis bankers seem 
to have thrown caution to the winds when selling loans, should not be generalized. Too 
much capital inflow is undesirable, but no net capital inflow at all might jeopardize the 
liberalization effort as well. In order to ensure at least the availability of a modest volume 
of foreign credit or direct investments, it would be helpful if foreign governments and/or 
official financial institutions made stand-by credits available. Besides, capital may well 
flow out, if for instance a government has not yet earned itself a fair degree of credibility 
or if the domestic capital market has not yet been liberalized and interest rates are still 
subject to ceilings (Edwards, 1984(a), p. 3). A wish on the part of domestic wealth 
holders for portfolio diversification after liberalization of the capital account may play a 
role as well (see for further discussion Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez, 1993). 
Apart from abolishing payménts restrictions, other import (and indeed export) restric-
tions can also be reduced. A liberalization of trade can take different forms. One could 
opt for the cold turkey method and sweep aside all import restrictions in one feil swoop, 
replacing them by a low (uniform) tariff. It is also possible to go about it more cautious-
ly. Liberalization really implies two different things: one, removing price distortions, 
two, opening up the domestic market to foreign trade. Of course, import and export 
restrictions in themselves create price distortions, but it is possible to reduce price 
distortions without opening up the domestic market. As Dornbusch (1991, p. 34) has 
argued, it is possible, and indeed in some circumstances advisable, to put liberalization 
through in two rounds. First, after payménts have been made free quotas and licences can 
be abolished too and a uniform high tariff can be introduced. This goes a long way to 
reduce price distortions and in addition exposes the domestic tradeables sector to the fresh 
winds of competition, or rather a fresh breeze. Secondly, tariffs could be lowered 
gradually. If foreign capital is not available in sufficiënt amounts and a strong temporary 
real depreciation is not though advisable, because of fear of price instability and possibly 
also out of fear for inflation, this could be an attractive option. In either case, moreover, 
the government gets some breathing space before income from trade taxes f all. 
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It should be obvious from this analysis that no hard-and-fast rule can be given. The 
measures to be taken depend on expected net capital flows and the expected responses of 
the tradeables sector to a reduction of protection (see for some finer welfare theoretic 
points based on second-best considerations Falvey and Kim, 1992). 
6. OBSTACLES TO LIBERALIZATION AND DEVALUATION 
Several forces work against liberalization and the devaluation it implies. First of all, 
devaluation and liberalization may be beneficial for exporting industries, but the benefits 
must be worked for and can only be reaped in the future, whereas the losers, first of all 
producers of importables, feel their loss at once. The losers therefore will tend to fight 
harder for maintaining their privileges, i.e., their sheltered position in the market, than 
the beneficiaries fight for liberalization. 
Next, if governments have pledged to fight inflation and maintain fixed exchange rates, 
to devalue is tantamount to admitting defeat. If then a crisis develops in which a devalu-
ation can no longer be avoided, the political life of the minister of finance or even the 
cabinet as a whole is in danger (see Cooper, 1973, pp. 193-'4 for empirical fmdings). 
One should not, though, jump to the conclusion that devaluation is risky for one's 
political life. Rather, it seems better both for one's political life and the economy to 
devalue before a crisis develops than to make promises and be forced to renege on them. 
At first sight, there may also be respectable economie arguments against devaluation. 
Residents who have borrowed abroad or at least have borrowed in foreign exchange and 
have failed to cover their position suffer a loss if devaluation takes place (unless the 
devaluation was expected at the time the the loans were concluded and the devaluation 
risk consequently was reflected in the interest rate difference between domestic currency 
and foreign currency loans). Serious bouts of business failures may even result, as was 
the case in the early 1980s in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. These were, however, to a 
large degree the consequence of high real interest rates following from attempts to defend 
the rate of exchange and of distress borrowing by firms in the tradeables sector trying to 
survive in the face of a low RER {Trends in Developing Economies 1990, p. 101; Corbo 
and de Melo, 1987, p. 133). Better then, again, to devalue at an earlier stage. 
Another concern was that devaluations would hardly help boost export proceeds in a 
world where price elasticities were presumably low. Such fears can be justified in the 
case of countries that export primary commodities and not much else, the (short-run) 
price elasticity of supply often being low. In Latin America (including the Caribbean) 
manufactured products amounted to only 7 per cent of merchandise export in 1965, but in 
1990 comprised 32 per cent of merchandise exports (World Development Report 1992, p. 
249), so this objection has lost much of its force. Moreover, supply elasticities of primary 
commodities will be higher in the long run than in the short run. 
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Devaluation makes the domestic price level rise. If, however, domestic monetary and 
fiscal policies are sufficiently restrictive the price level rises less than the exchange rate 
and real depreciation takes place (see for empirical evidence Cooper, 1973; Connolly and 
Taylor, 1976; Kamin, 1988; of course, if macroeconomic policies are insufficiently 
restrictive inflation will nullify real depreciation, see for such cases Bautista, 1982; 
Edwards, 1989). Furthermore, if devaluation is coupled with foreign trade and payments 
liberalization, the disappearance of rents, the lowering of import duties and the freer 
availability of imported inputs will dampen any tendency of prices to increase. If before 
devaluation price controls were in force, black markets are likely to have developed and 
actual prices will have been higher than official prices. Price increases as found in official 
statistics then overstate actual price increases. Finally, more exports and a generally 
higher degree of participation in international trade mean more division of labour, 
involving the closing down of inefficiënt industries and the expansion of efficiënt ones, 
enabling these to reap economies of scale. Average costs are lowered in this way. 
Another problem can be the loss of government income after a liberalization involving 
the lowering of import duties. As was mentioned in the preceding section, a shift from 
non-tariff restrictions to tariffs enables a government to reduce the general level of trade 
restrictions (expressed in tariff equivalents) and still increase government revenue.2 
7. COFFEE AND OTHER DRUGS AS GERMS OF DUTCH DISEASE 
Fajnzylber (1988, p. 18) notes that there is, on a world scale, a surprising positive 
correlation between a lack of riatural resources and the level of competitiveness in the 
industrial sector. This is perhaps less surprising than it looks at first sight. Obviously, if a 
country is able to earn foreign exchange by exporting primary commodities, there is less 
need to concentrate on exports of manufactures. Indeed, there will be less opportunity to 
do so. Exports of primary commodities exert such downward pressure on the rate of 
exchange that relatively few manufacturing industries are able to face competition in 
world markets. In fixed-but-adjustable peg systems export surpluses develop that either 
create inflation or induce a revaluation, in either case effecting a real appreciation. 
If, from a given situation, exports of primary commodities start to grow, the manufac-
turing sector is apt to suffer. We then have a case of Dutch disease (see, from an 
extended literature, Corden, 1984). What happens, in terms of the dependent-economy 
model, is this. We split up the tradeables sector in the primary commodity sector Tl and 
the manufacturing sector T2. Tl produces mainly for export. Let Tl prices rise and Tl 
exporters earn more dollars. They spend part of it domestically. As a result, nontrade-
ables N become more expensive in terms of T2 and T2 imports increase. Furthermore, 
factors of production move from T2 to Tl and N. T2 production declines and net imports 
of T2 rise sharply. Thus, there is de-industrialization. This effect will be strengthened if 
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Tl exports bring in such amounts of money that a nominal appreciation is called for or 
takes place automatically. 
The development of manufacturing industry will have been hampered in this way in 
countries such as Chile, with its copper exports, and Colombia, with its exports of coffee, 
coal and oil. Indeed, Edwards' (1984(b)) story of Colombia during the 1975-79 coffee 
boom exactly follows the scenario just sketched. Illegal drugs exports are also likely to 
have contributed to Dutch disease de-industrializing, in so far as the proceeds from drugs 
exports have not been invested abroad. Apart from illegal activities, if a country has a 
comparative advantage for primary commodities, allocational efficiency demands that 
primary commodities rather than manufactured products are produced and exported. The 
development policy of many countries has been aimed, however, at developing manufac-
turing industry, from a belief that manufacturing industry is the epitome of modernity or, 
in a more sophisticated form, from the idea that industrialization is associated with 
increasing returns and external economies and therefore is a prerequisite for continued 
growth (see Lal, 1983, Ch. 4; containing a harsh criticism of forced industrialization). 
Empirical evidence for such countries as the Netherlands, however, shows that labour 
productivity in the agrarian sector need not grow at a lower rate than in the industrial 
sector.3 Nevertheless, high productivity growth inevitably leads to an expulsion of labour 
from the agrarian sector. Wages have to be suffïciently low to make at least some T2 
industries competitive and to enable the N sector to absorb sufficiënt numbers of workers. 
A sudden expansion of primary commodity exports may lead to real appreciations that 
hamper such adjustments. Given that money wages are sticky downward, an upsurge in 
unemployment is bound to result. This is the more harmful for the economy if such a 
boom is temporary and capital" markets imperfections preclude T2 industries to bridge a 
temporary bad situation. A boom in coffee or drugs exports can thus quite seriously 
hinder the development of manufacturing industry, at the cost of high unemployment. 
It should be noted that foreign economie aid, if it amounts to a substantial fraction of 
GDP and is converted into domestic currency, will also cause Dutch disease phenomena. 
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8. CHILE 
8.1. Opening up the economy: 1974-79 
We will now give a round-up of Chile's liberalization efforts, with the emphasis on 
exchange-rate policy and in the next two sections the experience of Colombia and 
Uruguay will be reviewed. Figures will be presented showing the relationship between the 
openness of the economy, as measured by the ratio between exports and GDP, and RER. 
Now there is a difficulty here. A dominant primary export commodity may mess up the 
picture. If the world price of such a product rises, ceteris paribus, export proceeds as a 
percentage of GDP of the exporting country will rise too, whereas its RER will f all. 
Given world demand for the commodity in question, a devaluation of the exporter's 
currency will also increase openness as measured by the exports/GDP ratio. This time 
around RER has risen, though. The increase in openness may only be a statistical 
artefact, resulting from the domestic price increase of such a Tradeable II commodity, in 
McKinnons terminology4. For other products, Tradeables I, there will in general be a 
more unequivocally positive relationship between RER and export performance, given 
sufficiently high elasticities. For Chile and Colombia we therefore also present figures for 
exports minus copper and coffee exports, respectively. This procedure at least reduces the 
direct effect of relative price changes of Tradeables II on the exports/GDP ratio. 
After the overthrow of the Unidad Popular government in September 1973, the 
Pinochet government in 1975 turned to Chicago-educated technocrats to run the economy. 
These so-called Chicago boys or Chicago kids resolved on an unprecedented opening-up 
of the economy over quite a short period. Nontariff barriers were abolished and tariffs 
were reduced from a weighted average of 105 per cent and a maximum of 750 per cent in 
September 1973 to a 10 per cent flat rate, with the exception of cars over 850 cc 
capacity, in June 1979 (see for an account Corbo and de Melo, 1985, p. 8). 
In order to reverse the extremely high inflation brought about by the Unidad Popular 
government an orthodox deflation was engineered. Still, inflation remained high and 
devaluations were inescapable. Chile went on a floating-rate system and 1975 saw a real 
devaluation of close on 25 per cent. One cause was the dismantling of protection. 
Moreover, exports had been hit by a fall in copper prices and a quadrupling of oil prices. 
In 1976 the multiple exchange rate system was replaced by a unified exchange rate. The 
rate of exchange became the main tooi in the fight against inflation (see Edwards 1986(b) 
p. 247). Both in 1976 and 1977 10 per cent revaluations were implemented, foliowed by 
the introduction of a tablita in early 1978. In figures 5 and 6 we see a fall in RER. In 
true textbook fashion, the capital account was not liberalized in step with the current 
account. Restrictions on medium-term capital flows were not lifted until April 1980, but 
even then restrictions remained in place for inflows of capital with less than two years 
maturity. 
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Interviews with entrepreneurs conducted by a World Bank team (Corbo and de Melo, 
1985, p. 8) show that the credibility of the policy of dismantling trade restrictions was 
high, which means that business firms did not hesitate to adjust to the new environment.5 
The virtual abolishment of protection involved drastic changes in relative prices, not only 
between tradeables and nontradeables, but also among tradeables, which had been subject 
to a wide range of different import tariffs. The reallocations of factors of production 
involved made increased labour mobility of the essence. Internal reallocations of labour 
between jobs and layoffs became easier. Business firms responded to the opening-up of 
the economy by drastically reducing costs through streamlining production (Corbo and 
Sanchez, 1985, p. 108-9; see also Edwards, 1986(b), p. 254 for changes in value added 
per worker). A typical response of import-competing firms was also to increase the 
quality of their products (Corbo and Sanchez, 1985, p. 111). Inevitably, the 1975 
depression, partly engineered by the govemment's deflation policy but also a result of 
external developments, combined with the industrial restructuring following the dis-
mantling of protection to increase unemployment. 
8.2. Squeezing inflation out of the economy, 1979 - 1982 
Notwithstanding the measures taken, inflation remained at a worryingly high level. The 
government decided to increase reliance on the exchange rate as an anti-inflationary 
weapon. This policy was based on the explicitly professed belief that the dependent-
economy model was applicable. The tablita introduced in 1978 was replaced in June 1979 
by a fixed dollar rate. The idea both with the tablita and the fixed rate was to squeeze 
inflation out of the economy and reduce the rate of inflation expected by economie agents. 
In this the government succeeded, but, at least partly as a result of wage indexation, it 
took to 1981 before inflation converged on 
the world average of 9.5 per cent. During 
the adjustment period, though, the Chilean 
price level had risen vis-a-vis the world 
price level. In other words, RER feil (see 
figures 5 and 6). 
The real appreciation of the Chilean 
peso hit the tradeables sector more than it 
had done a few years earlier, when it had 
been relatively easy to improve efficiency 
(Corbo and Sanchez, 1985, p. 114; see 
for a detailed analysis based on financial 
statements of industrial enterprises Galvez
 R g u r e 5 m R md o p e n n e s s o f t h e Chilean 
and Tybout, 1985). The current account
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lurched heavily into deficit, to the tune of 13.7 per cent of GDP in 1981 (Corbo, 1985, p. 
906), capital inflows soared and, in conformity with the two-sector dependent economy 
model, the nontradeables sectors, such as construction, commerce and other services, 
boomed (Corbo and Sanchez, 1985, p. 51). Capital inflows had contributed a great deal 
to the fast increase in the money supply. Notwithstanding the restrictions on capital 
inflows, the monetary expansion only subsided when the 1981-82 debt crisis made 
international capital flows to Latin America dry up (see for figures Corbo and Sanchez, 
1985, p. 89). 
The story can easily be told in terms of the dependent-economy model. The capital 
inflow had fmanced a nontradeables boom and an excess demand for tradeables, i.e., a 
current-account deficit. RER feil, until capital inflows suddenly stopped (see figure 5). 
Projects in the nontradeables sector remained unfinished and RER had to rise steeply in 
order to make the current account move in the direction of equilibrium. To the same end, 
domestic absorption had to fall. A rise in RER implied either a fall in nontradeable prices 
or a rise in tradeable prices. The former would have taken time and would have implied 
even higher unemployment than actually was the case. So there had to be a sharp nominal 
devaluation of the peso. 
A collapse of the financial sector helped put the entire policy of the government in 
jeopardy. All the time, real interest rates had remained disconcertingly high af ter the 
liberalization of the capital market. This may have been the result of a high demand for 
loans by firms desperate for funds in order to avoid bankruptcy, and of devaluation 
expectations. The squeezing of the tradeables sector resulting from the fall in RER may 
have played a role here too, as it forced firms to seek loans at all cost (Edwards, 1990, 
pp. 8, 9). It seems that right fröm 1974-5 Uhe baitks had been used by busiiiessmen tq 
finance the acquisition and growth of 
firms within the conglomerate they con-
trolled, in the process accumulating bad 
loans. Prudential supervision was virtually 
nonexistent. Bad debts and high dollar 
liabilities combined to plunge the banking 
sector into crisis after the fall of the peso 
in 1982. The government had to step in 
and take over a number of privatized 
banks. The privatization programme of the 
government had suffered a serious setback 
(reprivatization of the banks started in 
1985). 
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and RER for Chile, metals and ores ex-
cluded. Note that the figure of exports/GDP 
for 1982 is lacking, which gives the pro-
bably wrong impression that the curve starts 
rising sharply after 1981 already. 
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8.3. Back from the brink, 1982 - .. 
Recession hit the economy in 1982, triggered by world depression and the drying up of 
capital inflows - which had amounted to no less than about 15 per cent of GDP in 1981 
(Harberger, 1986, p. 235) - and compounded by the low RER, high real interest rates and 
the downward inflexibility of real wages. The peso was devalued by 18 per cent in June 
1982 whilst wage indexation was suspended. Further devaluations and exchange rate 
policy switches foliowed and between June 1982 and June 1983 the peso devalued by 99 
per cent (i.e., the dollar price of the peso rosé by nearly 100 per cent), causing the 
sought-for real depreciation. In 1984 the Chicago boys were out and import tariffs were 
raised to 35 per cent. These and other measures to stimulate the economy only resulted in 
rapidly increasing inflation. In 1985 Corbo (1985 p. 909) wrote: "Today it appears that 
the reforms failed", but in that same year a fresh start was made, again relying on market 
forces and macroeconomic stability. The increased import tariffs have gradually been 
reduced again to 11 per cent in June 1991. 
Economie policy was now firmly aimed at increasing the real exchange rate, i.e., at a 
real depreciation. Thanks to sufficiently restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, the 
nominal depreciation was not matched by increasing inflation (cf Edwards and Edwards, 
1992, p. 209). RER increased sharply over a number of years and the openness of the 
economy grew roughly in step. New products were offered on export markets. It is 
noteworthy in this respect that products such as canned fish and canned fruits did not do 
nearly as well as, e.g., apples and grapes, the difference being that they require higher 
marketing efforts. The government did not provide a clear export promotion strategy 
(Arriagada, 1985, p. 122). This is in marked contrast to such Asian countries as Taiwan 
and South Korea (Lin, 1988, p. S157). 
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9. COLOMBIA 
Colombia's development policy in the 1950s and early 1960s was based on import 
substitution. Further import subsitution behind high import bamers was not really viable 
(cf Trade Policy Reforms, 1992, p. 109). No sweeping reforms were implemented, 
though. The balance of payments was highly dependent on coffee exports. A near-
doubling of coffee prices in 1976 for instance led to an external payments surplus. This 
was foliowed by higher inflation in the next year (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1993, p. 20). 
Expansionary macroeconomic policies combined with both a fall in coffee prices and a 
fall in RER in 1981 to worsen the external situation. Moreover, as in Chile, lending to 
conglomerates had landed a number of banks in bankruptcy, forcing the government to 
nationalize them (Supelano, 1992, p. 853). The trade liberalization efforts that had been 
under way were put to an end and import licensing became a prominent feature. 1984 saw 
the introduction of an orthodox adjustment programme which included a sizeable 
depreciation in 1985 (Corden, 1991, p. 70; Liuksila, 1992, p. 40). This made RER 
increase steeply. The government also liberalized foreign trade by reducing import 
licensing requirements and lowering import duties (Schloss and Thomas, 1986; Hommes, 
1991). In 1986 the current account of the balance of payments took a turn for the better, 
both as a result of restrictive macroeconomic policy measures that reduced the budget 
deficit and because of a rise in coffee prices. After 1986, coffee exports (expressed in 
dollars) feil back to roughly half the 1986 level, but RER increased and non-coffee 
exports rosé in step. In 1990, when a new government took office, measures were 
introduced to further open up the Colombian economy, intensifying the efforts which the 
outgoing administration had starled in its closing days (Supelano, 1992, p. 854). 
Colombia has to cope with an influx of money from drugs trafficking. The central bank 
has a special window, the ventanilla siniestra, where no questions are asked about the 
money's provenance {Colombia, 1989, p. 
14). The revenues from cocaine sales are 
estimated at some two to three billion 
dollars every year, as against $1.4 to 1.7 
billion from coffee (1987 - 1991 figures, 
from International Financial Statistics; 
total official exports rising in this period 
from $4.6 to $7.2 billion). On top of 
those cocaine dollars there are inflows 
from illegal exports of marihuana, gold 
and emeralds (Vaessen, 1990, p. 9). Other 
estimates work out much higher, though. 
Figure 7. RER and opennesTof the econo- According to estimates by E. Crawley 
mv Colombia export revenues of cocaine from Colombia 
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in 1990 totalled between $11.5 billion and nearly $24 billion, from which $1.8 billion and 
$3.7 billion imported raw material should be subtracted (quoted by Fonseca, 1992, p. 
504). It is not clear, however, how much of these export earnings are channelled abroad. 
Some of it at least seems to have found its way into investment in land and company 
shares (Supelano, 1992, p. 853), thus driving up asset prices and probably the relative 
price of nontradeables. 
Table 8 shows that non-coffee exports as a percentage of GDP are closely related to 
RER. The fall in coffee export proceeds after 1986 is more than compensated by the 
absolute and relative rise in non-coffee exports. Non-coffee exports never exceeded 54 
per cent of total exports over the 1975 - 1986 period, but have since monotonously risen 
from 63.6 per cent in 1987 to 80.7 per cent in 1991 (figures from International Financial 
Statistics). Both RER and non-coffee exports as a percentage of GDP would most 
probably have been on a higher level, though, but for drugs exports. That would have 
been beneficial for employment, if we make the reasonable assumption that more man-
hours of labour are involved in producing $1 million net exports of non-coffee non-drug 
goods than in producing of $1 million of net drugs exports. 
10. URUGUAY 
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Uruguay has had a long history of protection. It already started in 1875 and in the mid-
1950s economie stagnation set in, with protection becoming increasingly more onerous 
and complicated (de Melo and Dhar, 1992, p. 30). 
1959 saw the introduction of a dual exchange rate system, which replaced the multiple 
rate system until then in force. The dual system included a fixed commercial rate, which 
was devalued three times in the year of 
introduction, and a floating financial rate. 
Inflation soared and over the 1963-68 
period the peso feil from 11 to 250 in the 
U.S. dollar. From 1968 to March 1972 
the exchange rate was fixed, but prices 
continued rising and the imposition of a 
50 per cent tax on all foreign transactions 
in 1971 meant a de facto devaluation. In 
early 1972 the peso was devalued to 500 
per dollar and a crawling peg system was 
introduced. The period 1974-78 was o-
riented towards liberalization and stabili-
zation under Minister of Economie Affairs 
Alejandro Vegh Villegas. The capital 
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Figure 8. RER and openness of the Colom-
bian economy, measured by the non-coffee 
exports/GDP ratio. 
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account was liberalized in 1974. Import quotas and licensing requirements were abolished 
in 1975 and controls on capital goods imports in 1977. In contrast to Chile, import 
restrictions were maintained (which were connected with extensive rent-seeking activities, 
de Melo and Dhar, 1992, p. 31). Liberalization of the capital account came first, soon 
accompanied by domestic financial reform (Edwards 1990 p. 7). Under Vegh's successor 
Valentin Arismendi (1979-81) there was a policy shift away from growth towards the 
reduction of inflation. The authorities firmly believed that the Law of One Price held for 
tradeables and, in addition, that capital markets were perfect, i.e., that the Law of One 
Price held for the rate of interest as well (Mezzera and de Melo, 1985, p. 160). A tablita 
system was introduced in January, 1979. In January 1980 a programme of tariff reduc-
tions was announced, aimed at attaining a flat rate of 35 per cent in December, 1985 
(coupled to a reduction of export subsidies). The Law of One Price was proved wrong 
and we see RER fall (figure 9), but exports to Argentina held up for a time because of 
the real appreciation of the Argentine peso. Meanwhile, in conformity with the theoretic 
model, the capital-import financed demand pressure led to a boom in nontradeables, 
especially in residential construction. Private investment in construction rosé by 45.5 per 
cent in 1979 and a further 12.2 per cent in 1980 (Mezzera and de Melo, 1985, p. 162). 
The Argentine devaluation of March 1981, together with high energy prices and the 
international recession, left the Uruguayan peso seriously overvalued and in November 
1982 a flotation of the peso could no longer be averted. Here too, a financial crisis 
developed because banks had taken up dollar loans at high interest rates and borrowers 
were unable to pay off their debts. 
The stabilization experiment ended in failure. Since November 1982, when the peso 
started floating, it feil from 11.59 in the dollar to 2489 in the dollar at the end of 1991, 
whereas inflation usually exceeds the 60 per cent mark. The connection between RER and 
openness of the economy is less clearcut than in the cases of Chile and Colombia. One 
reason may be the preponderance of primary commodities in exports, but it may also be 
the case that rampant inflation makes the price system function less satisfactorily. 
11. FINAL OBSERVATIONS 
Devaluations are an inescapable feature of liberalization programmes. In a protectionist 
environment the real exchange rate is lower than the level that can be maintained after 
liberalization. The real exchange rate will have to rise, making a devaluation inevitable. It 
appears from empirical studies that the inflationary pressures that inevitably result from 
devaluations can be held in check through restrictive macroeconomic policies. This means 
that devaluations indeed help to raise the real exchange rate, provided macroeconomic 
policy is used to support the devaluation effort. Empirical research also suggests that the 
current account of the balance of payments reacts favourably to devalutions in such 
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Figure 9. RER and openness of the Uruguay 
economy. 
circumstances. The evidence from the three countries 
which have been studied here suggests that a rise in 
RER is instrumental in increasing the openness of the 
economy. More openness means more competition 
and a better division of labour and what evidence 
there is indeed points to an increase in efficiency and 
better product quality (apart from the evidence on 
Chile quoted above, see for additional evidence on 
the impact of trade liberalization and growth Trade 
Policy Reforms, 1992, ch. 5). On the debit side, a 
change in policy implies restructuring between and 
within industries, which can hardly fail to tem-
porarily increase unemployment. This is a sacrifice 
in the short term that may be expected to bring in 
rewards in the long term. All the signs are that orthodoxy works, but it probably helps if 
a country is not overly dependent on exports of primary commodities. The impact of a 
rise in RER on exports could be increased if governments supported the business 
community in improving its international marketing efforts. 
The experience so far has shown that a liberalization process can be seriously jeopar-
dized by crises in the financial sector. Prudential supervision apparently is a weak spot in 
a number of countries. In particular, there seems to be a need for stringent supervision on 
intra-conglomerate loans. 
In opening up the economy, Chile's laissez-faire approach is not the only option 
available. Within CEP AL theidea seems to have taken hold that the Latin American 
countries have to restructure their economies to become competitive and, at the same 
time, safeguard social equity. This calls for interaction between the government, business 
firms and non-profit institutions. It is not believed that simply opening up the economy 
and relying on export growth to dynamize the economy will do (see on this Bitar and 
Bradford, 1992). The Asian examples of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and Singapore 
indeed suggest that active government involvement is, at the least, not incompatible with 
bringing about growth combined with equity (whereas the Hong Kong government has 
been following a more hands-off type of policy, see Morawetz 1977 p. 39; The Newly In-
dustrializing Countries, 1988). The idea of liberalizing foreign trade itself does not seem 
to meet with much opposition any longer, and rightly so. 
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NOTES 
The data underlying Figures 5 through 9 are mostly from International Financial 
Statistics (IMF). Figures on RER before 1980 are for exports and were taken from 
Economie Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Export figures for 
metals and ores for Chile (which were subtracted from total exports in order to construct 
Figure 6) are from Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics (UNC-
TAD). There is an inconsistency in the Figures in that total exports refer to exports of 
goods and services whereas RER only refers to goods. 
Text notes: 
1. According to IMF figures net capital inflows into non-oil developing countries in 
the Western Hemisphere feil from $40.1 billion in 1981 and over $20 billion in each 
of the three preceding years to $4.1 billion in 1982 (World Economie Outlook, 
Occasional Paper 21, IMF, Washington, 1983). 
2. According to Dornbusch and Kuenzler (1993, p. 113) 12 per cent of total govern-
ment revenue in Latin America derives from taxes on international trade. See for 
more detailed figures on Colombia, Jamaica, and Mexico Trade Policy Reforms, 1992, 
pp. 123-25. 
3. From 1950 to 1978 labour productivity in Dutch agriculture rosé in step with labour 
productivity in Dutch manufacturing industry. From 1978 onwards the former grew 
much faster than the latter (Stolwijk, 1992, p. 14). 
4. Tradeables I are goods "in which producing firms can control (set) the market price 
for their own particular products"; "tradeables II are more homogeneous commodities 
where one firm's output may be graded and precisely compared to that of others" 
(McKinnon 1979 pp. 74-5). 
5. This was not reflected in the investment ratio, though (see for figures Zahler, 1980, 
p. 148 and Edwards (1986(b), p. 257). For one thing, public sector investment feil, for 
another, the allocation of investment will have been improved considerably. 
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